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Paper presented at the IREC “Governance issues in shifting industrial and employment
relations” from August 26th to 28th, 2004 at Utrecht University
Worker participation at the supervisory board has always been subject to controversial debate.
It  is  not  the aim of  this  paper  to  examine worker participation  as  to  its  advantages  and
disadvantages, but moreover to give the reader an overview of how companies can determine
the depth, form and level of worker participation by choosing between different legal structures
within the EU.
Generally  speaking,  three  alternatives  can  be  identified.  First  of  all,  companies  that  do
business  across  boarders  in  the  EU/EEA and  are  organised  as  joint-stock  companies  can
establish  a European Company (Societas Europaea = SE) from October 8th,  2004 on. The
Council  of  Ministers agreed on the European Company Statute during  the Nice Summit  in
December 2000 after more than 30 years of controversial debate. In this context two legal
instruments  were  enacted,  the  council  regulation  (No.  2157/2001)  on  the  Statute  for  a
European company, which rules the internal corporate governance structure of the SE, and the
council directive (2001/86/EC) supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard
to  the  involvement  of  employees  on  the  company  level,  which  emphasises  voluntary
negotiations between employees’ representatives, a so-called special negotiating body, and the
management. The negotiation’s outcome primarily  depends on the negotiating skills  of the
parties involved. If no agreement is achieved, but the management still wants to establish a
SE, standard rules are applied that are specified in the Annex of the Directive.
Secondly, companies organise continuously their activities by choosing a legal  form that is
provided by national  law. According to rulings as to freedom of establishment by the ECJ,
Member States have to recognise companies that have been established according to legal
provisions in another Member State as long as this Member State follows incorporation theory.
For the management this means, for instance, that it can establish a British private limited.
Then, the ltd. can even transfer its administrative centre to Germany. In order to do business
there, the ltd. must be registered in the German commercial register. Consequently, German
legislation regarding worker participation at the company level cannot be applied. 
As final point, the proposal for a EU directive on cross-border mergers of companies with share
capital is mentioned in this context. The proposal provides two alternatives concerning worker
participation in the case of a merger. On the one hand, one ore more companies participating
are subject to any form of worker participation so far and there are no national provisions on
worker  participation in the Member State, where the new company is incorporated. Then, a
procedure like it is provided by the SE Directive has to be established. On the other hand, the
Member State, in which the new company is incorporated, offers national provisions regarding
worker participation. Then, those have to be applied.
In sum, the above mentioned organisational alternatives might put considerable pressure on
the different industrial relations systems persistent in the EU. In the long run, this pressure
might  result  in  a convergence not only of the industrial  relations systems but also of the
corporate governance systems.
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Worker participation and the company's choice of its legal structure
Worker participation and the company's choice of its
legal structure
The legal structure1 of a company is considered as the institutional
frame,  respectively  the  legal  constitution,  of  a  company  (Werder,
1986)  that  lies  the  basis  for  its  internal  and  external  -  legal  -
relationships  (Buchheim,  2001).  Companies  are  free  to  chose
between legal forms offered by national legislators in accordance with
their  specific  needs.  The  issue  arises  especially  in  the  event  of
incorporation and reorganisation of a company, but the legal status
quo  might  also  be  subject  to  examination  when  environmental
conditions change (Wöhe, 2000). When examining various forms of
enterprise,  companies  seek  to  identify  the  legal  structure  that
supports their economic objectives best and ensures their survival not
only today but also in the future (Buchheim, 2001). Due to this fact
and the long-term impacts of this decision, it is seen as one of the
fundamental management decisions comparable with the decision on
the location (Wenz, 1993).
 
In  order  to  take  a  profound  decision,  management  requires
information  about  the  alternatives,  respectively,  the  specific
characteristics  of  the  various  forms  of  enterprise.  The  organic
structure,  liability  of  the  partners/shareholders,  reporting  and
publication duties, financing, profit- and loss-sharing, non-recurring
and recurring taxes, expenses relating to the legal form as well as co-
determination2 are  considered  as  relevant  characteristics
(Albach/Albach, 1989; Wöhe, 2000). 
1 The terms form of enterprise, legal form, and legal structure are used
interchangeably.
2 The terms co-determination, worker participation, and employee involvement are
used interchangeably.
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Considering German literature on the subject, it strikes that the focus
has been on taxation or company law aspects so far (for instance,
Lanz, 1978; Lühn, 2004). Even though various authors (for instance,
Albach/Albach,  1989;  Wöhe,  2000)  have  recognised  worker
participation as one of the decisive aspects in this context, there are
no  comprehensive  managerial  contributions  on  the  issue.
Consequently,  the  focus  of  this  paper  is  how  companies  can
determine  the  depth,  form  and  level  of  worker  participation  by
deciding in favour of a certain legal structure. However, it is not the
aim  of  this  paper  to  examine  national  forms  of  enterprise  or  to
compare them in detail regarding worker participation, but moreover
to present some alternatives provided by European legislation: the
European  company,  the  rulings  of  the  European  Court  of  Justice
regarding the freedom of establishment, and finally the proposal of
the Directive on cross-boarder mergers.
The European Company – Societas Europaea
The roots of the SE might be seen in the proposals of a transnational
form of enterprise that were discussed between 1926 and the late
1950ies by several institutions, for instance the drafts of the Council
of Europe (Theisen/Wenz, 2002). However, the idea of the European
company  (Societas  Europaea  =  SE)  came  into  being  after  the
agreement on the Treaties of Rome due to uprising demands for such
a legal form. As starting point can be seen two events in France: first
of all the presentation of the French notary Tibièrge who suggested
the  introduction  of  a  European  public  limited  company during  the
French Notary Convention in 1959 and the Convention of the Parisian
Law  Society  in  1960  (Bärmann,  1970).  Additionally,  the  Dutch
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Professor Sanders  pleaded  for the creation of a European company
related with a uniform company law in his first lecture in Rotterdam
(Sanders, 1960). By that, he stimulated the discussion resulting in
the  Commission's  first  proposal  for  a  regulation  (European
Commission,  1970).  In  comparison  to  the  company  law  in  most
Member  States  at  that  time,  the proposal  was groundbreaking by
creating  a  comprehensive  European  group  law  which  was
supplemented  by  a  Work's  Constitution  Act  (Blanquet,  2002).
However – or rather because of that - the Member States were not
about to accept it.
 
In  1987,  after  the  Council  of  Ministers  urged  the  Community
institutions  to  push  for  the  adaptation  of  company  law,  Jacques
Delors, who was President of the Commission, resumed the idea of a
European company. In 1989 and 1991, the Commission presented a
completely  revised  proposal  which  was  divided  into  two  parts:  a
regulation on the statute of the European company and a directive
supplementing this regulation with regard to the standing – explicitly
not participation - of employees (European Commission, 1989a and
1989b; European Commission, 1991a and 1991b). Additionally, the
SE became a hybrid form. This means that the institutional frame is
governed by Community law, while certain aspects, such as tax law,
are subject to national provisions. Regarding employee participation,
the directive would have put  companies  in  the position  to  choose
between  three  equivalent  models  of  employee  involvement  –
equivalent  in  the  view  of  the  Commission.  Due  to  disagreement
between Member States3 on employee involvement, the matter was
3 Especially Germany, Ireland and the UK disagreed with the European
Commission that the models and their impacts would be equivalent (Buchheim,
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let to rest again. That is how it happened that  the Single European
Market  came  into  force  without  a  common  European  form  of
enterprise.
 
In the middle/end of the 1990ies, the matter started moving again. In
June 1995, the group of experts on competitiveness presided over by
Carlo Ciampi published a report (CAG, 1995), in which they claimed
that  the  Single  European  Market  is  completed  as  recently  as
companies are able to do business in the European Union in a more
efficient and less costly way, for example by the implementation of a
European form of enterprise. In sum, the group of experts expected a
saving of ECU 30 millions, an estimation that was widely criticised as
being too high (Buchheim, 2001).
Shortly after, the Commission invited Etienne Davignon to preside a
group  of  high-ranking  experts  on  European  systems  of  worker
involvement that  presented their  results  in  the so-called Davignon
Report (European Commission, 1997). Actually, the group wanted to
resume the  debate  about  the  European  company  by focusing  “on
clearly identified avenues of approach which it felt could be useful”
and  not  by  preparing  a  comprehensive  legal  text.  Eventually,  the
group  made  clear  that  the  great  diversity  of  national  models  of
employee involvement is a major obstacle for further harmonisation.
Thus,  they  supported  “negotiated  solution(s)  tailored  to  cultural
differences and taking account of the diversity of situations. […] The
path we are opening up is therefore that of negotiations in good faith
between the parties concerned, with a view to identifying the best
2001).
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solution  in  each  case,  without  imposing  minimum  requirements.”
(European Commission, 1997, paragraph 94c and 95)
 
Although  the  Davignon  Report  succeeded  in  resuming  discussion
between  the  Member  States,  it  needed  another  two  compromises
before it could come to the “miracle of Nice” (Hirte, 2002:1). The first
compromise  is  the  so-called  “before  and  after”  principle  and  was
made in 1998 (Herfs-Röttgen, 2001; Blanquet 2002). It specifies that
employees'  acquired  rights  regarding worker  participation  must  be
secured, meaning that rights in force before the establishment of the
SE should provide the basis for employee rights of involvement in the
SE” (Directive 2001/86/EC, Recital  18).  After  this agreement, only
one Member State, namely Spain, still impeded the deal. During the
Nice Summit in 2000, the Council agreed on an opting out clause that
was added due to Spain’s urging (Köstler, 2001; Pluskat, 2001). That
means that Member States have the opportunity to make it possible
for an SE to register without an agreement on the involvement of
employees  in case of  a merger  between companies that  were not
subject to worker participation so far (Directive 2001/86/EC, Recital
9).
On October 8th, 2001, after more than 30 years of discussion, the
Council  of  Ministers  enacted  two  legal  instruments:  the  council
regulation (No. 2157/2001) on the Statute for a European company
(SE),  subsequently referred to as SE/Re,  and the council  directive
(2001/86/EC)  supplementing  the  Statute  for  a  European  company
with regard to the involvement of employees, subsequently referred
to  as  SE/Di.  Consequently,  the  SE  can  be  found  by  joint-stock
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companies  on  October  8th,  2004  for  the  first  time.  Both  legal
instruments are specified in more detail below.
The  SE  is  available  only  for  companies  with  certain  legal  forms,
namely joint-stock companies such as the British plc. or ltd. or the
German  AG  or  GmbH4.  Moreover,  companies  concerned  must  be
subject to law in at least two Member States (article 2 SE/Re). In this
context, the SE, which has a separate legal personality, must be seen
as another legal alternative for joint stock companies doing business
in Europe.  The SE/Re contains provisions regarding the SE’s internal
corporate  governance  structure  (see  for  example,  Jahn/Herfs-
Röttgen,  2001;  Heinze,  2002;  Lutter  2002;  Mävers,  2002).  In
contrast to prior drafts the approved regulation does not constitute a
European company act, but provides companies with an institutional
frame that is filled by national law. Consequently, it cannot be spoken
about  one  uniform European  company  but  moreover  285 different
ones (Jahn/Herfs-Röttgen, 2001; Schwarz, 2001). 
As the minimum capital, which, in general, must be divided in shares,
amounts to € 120.000,--6, its application seems reasonably only for
large groups (Hommelhoff, 2001). However, Blanquet (2002) sees it
as moderate and refers to recital 13 of the SE/Re in which is said “ a
minimum amount of capital should be set so that they have sufficient
4 For a comprehensive list of all legal forms concerned at least for the EU-15 the
reader is referred to the Annex of the SE/Re.
5 An SE can be established not only by companies registered in the EU but also by
companies registered in the European Economic Area (EEA) due to the decision
by the EEA joint committee (No 93/2002) to accept the SE/Re and the SE/Di.
6 Countries that are not members of the European Monetary Union are free to rule
that the capital and the annual reports are kept and presented in the currency of
that country.
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assets  without  making  it  difficult  for  small  and  medium-sized
undertakings to form SEs”. Additionally the abbreviation “SE”, which
is provided exclusively for European companies, must be put in front
of or behind the company name (SE/Re Article 11). For the statutes is
specified that the SE must have a general meeting of shareholders
and either a management board and a supervisory board, so-called
two-tier  system,  or  an  administrative  board,  so-called  single-tier
system, as governing bodies (SE/Re Articles 38 to 45 and 52 to 59).
The companies are free to choose between the one-tier-system and
the two-tier-system.
 
Generally speaking, there are four ways of establishing a SE. First of
all, an SE can be established by a merger, which is only available to
public limited companies from at least two different Member States7.
Secondly, a SE can be found by the formation of a holding company,
which is available to public and private limited companies that have
their registered offices in at least two different EU or EEA Member
States or have subsidiaries or branches in Member States other than
that of their registered office. Thirdly, a SE can be established by the
formation of  a joint  subsidiary,  which is  available  under the same
circumstances applicable to the formation of a holding company to
any legal entities governed by public or private law. Finally, the SE
can be found by the conversion of a public limited company that was
previously formed under national law and had a subsidiary in at least
one  other  EU or  EEA Member  State  for  at  least  two  years.  Even
though a (national) public limited company converted into a SE is not
allowed  to  move  its  registered  office  at  the  same  time  as  the
7 In this context, Member States refers to EU Member States and to EEA Member
States.
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transformation takes place (SE/Re Article 37 paragraph 3) and is not
allowed to reduce the intensity of board-level representation (SE/Di
Article  4  paragraph  4),  companies  might  benefit  from  a
transformation,  because  then they  can  choose  freely  between  the
one-tier and the two-tier system of corporate governance. According
to  Wenz  (2003)  this  aspect  increases  undoubtedly  the  interest  of
companies in the SE. 
 
In  addition,  Wenz  (2003)  identifies  another  application  of  the
European  company  statute,  the  cross-border-SE  that  means  the
transfer of registered office (SE/Re Article 7). According to the SE/Re
the transfer of registered office does not require liquidation and new
foundation of the company anymore. Rather companies are able to
transfer  their  registered  office  by  preserving  their  legal  identity
resulting in a higher degree of mobility of the SE. Even though the
possibility to transfer the registered office is not completely unlimited,
as  aforementioned,  the  provisions  contribute  considerably  to  the
completion of the SE’s freedom of establishment and will increase the
mobility of European companies.
As mentioned above worker involvement is governed by the SE/Di
(see for instance Pluskat, 2001; Teichmann, 2002; ). The crucial link
between  the  SE/Re  and  the  SE/Di  is  that  the  SE  may  not  be
registered  unless  an  agreement  on  arrangements  for  employee
involvement has been concluded (Article 12 paragraph 2 SE/Re; see
also Blanquet, 2002). By that, it is guaranteed that these provisions
are respected (Weiss, 2003).  In this context, it is stressed that the
SE/Di  does  not  affect  national  provisions  with  respect  to  worker
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involvement at the plant level meaning that, for instance, the German
Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz – BetrVG) is still
applicable (Köstler, 2002).
According to the SE/Di involvement of employees is understood as
any  mechanism through  which  employees  or  their  representatives
might influence decision making within the company (Article 2 lit. h
SE/Di). In this regard, the SE/Di draws a clear distinction between
information8 and consultation9 across boarders on the one hand and
participation10 on the other (Heinze, 2002; Teichmann, 2002; Weiss,
2003). While a proceeding for information and consultation must be
established in every SE by creating a representative body, the form of
participation  or  co-determination in  the SE is  subject  to voluntary
negotiations.  These  negotiations  on  worker  involvement  are
conducted  by  the  management  and  the  special  negotiating  body
(SNB), which consists of employees' representatives that are elected
or appointed in proportion to the number of employees employed in
each  Member  State  by  the  companies  concerned  (for  details  see
SE/Di Article 3). Generally speaking, the representative body and the
administrative or supervisory body of the SE “shall work together in a
spirit of cooperation” (SE/Di Article 9).
8 Information  means  that  the  competent  organ  of  the  SE  informs  the
representative body about any issues that concern the SE itself, its subsidiaries
or its establishments in another Member State so that the representative body is
able to assess in depth the possible impacts (Se/Di Article 2 lit. i).
9 Consultation  means  the  establishment  of  dialogue  and  exchange  of  views
between  the  representative  body  and  the  competent  organ  of  the  SE.  The
opinion  expressed  by  the  representative  body  might  be  considered  in  the
decision making within the SE (SE/Di Article 2 lit. j).
10Participation  means the influence of  the representative  body on the decision
making within the SE by the right to elect or appoint some of the members of
the company’s supervisory or administrative organ, or the right to recommend
and/or oppose the appointment of some or all of the members of the company’s
supervisory or administrative organ (SE/Di Article 2 lit k).
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The task of  the SNB is  to negotiate  with the management of  the
companies concerned about an agreement on the arrangements for
the involvement of the employees within the SE (SE/Di Article 4). The
duration of negotiations is fixed by the SE/Di to six months, but may
be extended up to one year from the establishment of the SNB by
agreement of the parties involved (SE/Di Article 5). The agreement
shall  specify  the  scope  of  the  agreement,  the  composition,  the
functions,  the procedure  for  information and consultation,  and the
frequency  of  meetings  of  the  representative  body  as  well  as  the
financial and material resources to be allocated to the representative
body.  If  the  SNB  and  the  management  agree  on  board-level
representation, the number of members and the procedure of their
election, appointment, recommendation or opposition by employees
and their rights shall be specified in the agreement, too. Additionally,
it shall specify the date of entry into force, its duration, cases were
the  agreement  should  be  renegotiated  and  the  procedure  for
renegotiation.
If the parties do not arrive at an agreement within the prescribed
time and the management still  wants to form a SE, or the parties
agree so, then standard rules are applicable (SE/Di Article 7 and part
three of the annex). In the annex of the SE/Di, three parts of the
standard  rules  are  distinguished.  The  standard  rules  for  the
composition of the representative body (SE/Di Annex part 1) as well
as the standard rules for information and consultation (SE/Di Annex
part  2)  are  similar  to  those  that  are  set  out  in  the  Directive  on
European Works Councils (Council Directive 94/45/EC; Weiss, 2003).
In the following paragraph, the standard rules for participation (SE/Di
Annex part 3) are presented in more detail, because they are seen as
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being crucial in this context (Weiss, 2003). Which standard rules are
applicable depends heavily on the form of foundation, the board-level
representation that was prevalent so far, and on the proportion of all
employees  of  the  companies  concerned  who  were  covered  by  a
certain  form  of  co-determination  (SE/Di  Article  7).  Regarding  the
establishment by transformation, the standard rules apply, when the
company concerned was subject to board-level representation so far
meaning that the same intensity shall continue to apply to the SE.
Regarding establishment by merger, the standard rules apply, when
25  percent  of  the  total  number  of  employees  of  the  companies
concerned were covered by some form of co-determination or even
less than 25 percent if the negotiating parties agree on its application.
Regarding the establishment by formation of a holding/subsidiary, the
standard rules apply, if 50 percent of the total number of employees
of  the  companies  concerned  were  covered  by  some  form  of  co-
determination or  even less than 50 percent if  the parties involved
agree so. 
Besides  provisions  on  the  negotiation  procedure  and the  standard
rules, the content of the agreement and the standard rules, the SE/Di
contains miscellaneous provisions as well. In section III of the SE/Di
provisions regarding the reservation and confidentiality (SE/Di Article
8), the operation of the representative body and procedure for the
information  and  consultation  of  employees  (SE/Di  Article  9),  the
protection of employees’ representatives (SE/Di Article 10), and the
misuse of  procedure  (SE/Di  Article  11)  can be found,  but are  not
presented here in detail. 
Page 12
The European Company – Societas Europaea
For an overview of the course of negotiations and its outcomes the
reader is referred to Figure 1.
Figure 1: Employee participation in the SE
(Adapting Blanquet, 2002; Keller, 2002; Heinze, 2002; Röthig, 2002)
As  presented  in  this  chapter,  the  SE/Re  contains  fundamental
provisions regarding the internal corporate governance structure and
the  transfer  of  registered  office.  Though,  Member  States  still
determine  a  great  deal  of  applicable  law  such  as  tax  law
(Hommelhoff,  2001;  Schulz/Geismar,  2001),  reporting  standards,
liability, and even rule amendment of the articles as well as capital
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raising  and  maintenance  of  capital  (Theisen/Wenz,  2002).
Consequently,  it  can  be  expected  that  there  will  be  considerable
differences in the SE’s design in the EU and the EEA. This diversity in
design and the simplified opportunity of transfer of registered office
might  challenge  the  different  corporate  governance  systems
persistent in the EU.
In this context, Grundmann (2001) argues that this competition of
European legislators should not be rejected but is even desirable as
far as this competition minimises state and market failure. If it results
in a climb to the top or a race to the bottom concerning company law
as well  as tax law standards in Europe,  which is  a controversially
discussed  issue,  cannot  be  predicted  (Charny,  1991;  Wymeersch,
2001).  At  the  same  time  the  SE  must  be  seen  as  mandatory
minimum standard  for  doing  business  cross-boarders  in  Europe  in
order to restrain unlimited, ruinous competition on establishments of
companies  (Theisen/Wenz,  2002).  By  and  large,  the  SE  as  an
alternative  legal  structure  increases  pressure  on  the  national
legislators in order to further harmonise company and tax law.
 
Besides  competition  between  the  legal  systems  of  countries,  the
introduction of the SE might lead to an enhancement of competition
between joint-stock companies governed by national legislation and
those governed by European legislation. While the management of SE
is free to choose between the one-tier and the two-tier structure, can
transfer its registered office without the SE losing its legal personality
at  any  time,  and  even  might  negotiate  on  worker  participation,
national joint-stock companies do not have this kind of choice. They
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must comply with  national  provisions.  Hence,  this  can be seen as
another  aspect  that  increases  pressure  on  national  legislators,  in
order  to  eliminate  differences  -  or  even  discrimination  -  between
national  forms  of  enterprise  and  those  created  by  European  law
(Theisen/Wenz, 2002).
 
Worker  participation  is  also  subject  to  those  pressures  for
harmonisation.  It  remains  to  be  seen  to  what  extent  the  SE
introduction contributes or even causes erosion of co-determination in
Germany  and  other  countries  highly-regulated  in  this  instance.
Although these pressures are considerable, some other aspects are
remarkably, too. Indeed, it is important to stress the paradigm shift
made  by  the  European  legislator.  The  Community  refrained  from
providing  models  of  co-determination  and  rather  provides
comprehensive rules regarding the negotiation procedure. Moreover,
the Community does not longer try to establish a specific institutional
pattern of  worker  participation,  but  rather  pushes procedures  that
promote the idea of worker participation in management’s decisions
(Weiss, 2003). 
 
Another  point  of  interest  in  this  context  is  that  board-level
representation is europeanised. So far, employees’ representatives in
the  competent  organ  represented  only  employees  from  the  home
country  of  the  company.  In  German  joint  stock  companies,  for
instance, with subsidiaries all over Europe only German employees’
representatives  have  been  involved  in  board-level  representation.
With the SE, this situation changes. Now, employees’ representatives
from all  countries, in which the SE operates,  might be involved in
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board-level representation. The composition of the competent organ
might prejudice those representatives  in countries  that had strong
positions  so  far,  such  as  Germany  or  Austria,  and  might  lead  to
different coalitions due to different preferences and, thus, to different
decisions. As a result, it is very difficult to predict the outcomes of the
negotiations.
The Freedom of Establishment – Recent Rulings of
the European Court of Justice
On September 30th, 2003 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) took
the decision on the Inspire Art case (C-167/01). It is another decision
in a row of decisions regarding the freedom of establishment. The
freedom of establishment is one of the principle freedoms granted by
the  EC  Treaty.  It  grants  all  EU  citizens  the  establishment  in  any
Member State and the practice of self-employment in that Member
State. This is not only applicable to natural persons but also to legal
persons.  With  this  regard,  primary  and  secondary  freedom  of
establishment can be distinguished. Primary freedom of establishment
is  understand  as  the  right  to  establish  the  headquarters,  while
secondary  freedom  of  establishments  concerns  the  setting-up  of
agencies,  branches,  or  subsidiaries  (ECT Articles  43  and 48).  Any
limitation of freedom of establishment or movement of capital must
be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest that
must be suitable to attain the objective and must be reasonable.
In the Daily-Mail-Case (Case 81/87 from September 27th, 1988), the
Daily Mail and General Trust PLC wanted to transfer its head office
from the UK to the Netherlands, because high hidden reserves should
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have  been  sold  under  more  favourable  Dutch  tax  law.  From  a
company law perspective there is no issue, because both countries
follow incorporation theory resulting in unlimited legal capacity of the
company. However, the transfer of the head office was subject to the
Inland Revenue's agreement due to tax law provisions. As the Inland
Revenue  wanted  to  keep  its  tax  claim on  the  hidden  reserves,  it
rejected the transfer. The ECJ argued in this case that the limitation
of  transfer  of  head  office  is  not  considered  as  a  violation  of  the
freedom  of  establishment,  for  the  reason  that  the  freedom  of
establishment  is  granted  by  the  possibility  to  set-up  agencies,
branches, or subsidiaries. The ECJ even says that a right to transfer
the head office from one Member State to another is not indicated by
Articles 43 and 48 ECT due to the status-quo of community law.
In Centros (Case C-212/97 from March 9th, 1999), the ECJ had to
take a decision on the secondary freedom of establishment. A Danish
couple found a private limited company (ltd.) in the UK, where it did
not commence operations. Then, they wanted to register a branch in
Denmark, which was rejected, because the Centros ltd. did not keep
Danish minimum requirements and, thus, by forming a British ltd.
intentionally evaded Danish company law. According to Roth (2000)
the  issue  is  not  the  freedom  of  establishment,  but  which
precautionary  restrictions  can  be  taken by  Member  States  against
companies that do business in its country but are subject to foreign
law  in  order  to  protect  domestic  stakeholders,  such  as  creditors,
employees, or minority shareholders. In this case, the ECJ decided
that registration cannot be refused due to the fact that companies
that were formed in accordance with the law of another Member State
intentionally  evaded  national  provisions.  “That  interpretation  does
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not, however, prevent the authorities of the Member State concerned
from adopting any appropriate measure for preventing or penalising
fraud” (marginal  note 39). However, these measures must fulfil the
four conditions test: “they must be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the
general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of
the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what
is necessary in order to attain it” (paragraph 34). In Centros, these
conditions were not fulfilled (see paragraph 35, 37 and 38).
In Überseering (Case C-208/00 from November 5th, 2001), the ECJ
dealt with the questions if it is in the spirit of Articles 43 and 48 ECT
to recognise the legal capacity and the capacity to be a party to legal
proceedings of companies that are incorporated in accordance with
the  law  of  another  Member  State,  even  if  this  company  has
transferred  its  head  office  to  this  second  Member  State.  The
subsequent  issue  is  if  Member  States  should  evaluate  the  legal
capacity  and  the  capacity  to  be  a  party  to  legal  proceedings  of
companies by the law of their countries of incorporation (paragraph
21). Überseering BV, incorporated and registered in the Netherlands,
was owner of a property in Düsseldorf and engaged a company for
the refurbishment of a hotel and a garage on the site. The contractual
obligations were fulfilled, but Überseering BV claimed that the paint
work was performed poorly. During the argument out of court, two
Germans took over most of the business share, resulting de facto in a
transfer  of  the  administrative  centre  from  the  Netherlands  to
Germany.  In  1996,  Überseering  BV brought  the action  before  the
court and claimed compensation of expenses incurred in remedying
the  defects.  The  Landesgericht  and  later  the  Oberlandesgericht
Page 18
The Freedom of Establishment – Recent Rulings of the European Court of Justice
dismissed the case,  because a company incorporated  under Dutch
law, but with its head office in Germany, does not have legal capacity
in  Germany  and,  thus,  could  not  bring  legal  proceedings  there
(paragraph 9). Actually, a company validly incorporated under the law
of another Member State and with its registered office there does not
have an alternative  to  reincorporation  in Germany,  if  it  wished to
enforce its rights before a German court (paragraph 79).
In  this  context,  the  ECJ  argues  that  the  requirement  of
reincorporation of the same company in Germany is considered even
as the negation of freedom of establishment (paragraph 81). “The
refusal  by  a  Member  State  to  recognise  the  legal  capacity  of  a
company formed in accordance with the law of another Member State
to  bring  legal  proceedings  before  a  German  court  amount  to  a
restriction  of  freedom  of  establishment  that  is,  in  principle,
incompatible with Articles 43 and 48 EC” (Roth, 2003:206; paragraph
82).  However,  certain  conditions  and  certain  circumstances  might
justify  restrictions  relating  to  the  general  interest,  such  as  the
protection  of  the  interests  of  creditors,  minority  shareholders,
employees  and  even  the  taxation  authorities  (paragraph  92).
Nevertheless, these objectives cannot justify refusal of the company's
legal capacity and, hence, of the company's capacity to be a part to
legal  proceedings (paragraph 93).  Therefore,  the ECJ  decides  that
“where a company formed in accordance with the law of a Member
State ('A') in which it has its registered office exercises its freedom of
establishment in another Member State ('B'), Articles 43 EC and 48
EC  require  Member  State  B  to  recognise  the  legal  capacity  and,
consequently, the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings which
the company enjoys under the law of its State of incorporation ('A')”
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(paragraph 95).
The last case presented is the Inspire Art Case (Case C-167/01 from
September 30th, 2003). In this case, the ECJ had to decide, whether
Member States are allowed to put limitations on foreign companies
incorporated under the law of another Member State that have been
recognised.  Thus,  the  Inspire  Art  case  starts  up  where  the
Überseering decision ends. Inspire Art was formed under British law
as  a  private  limited  company  and  registered  in  the  UK.  It  had  a
branch in the Netherlands, which was registered in the commercial
register without any indication that it was a formally foreign company
within the meaning of Article one of the WFBV (Wet op de Formeel
Buitenlandse  Vennootschappen  =  Law  on  Formally  Foreign
Companies). Due to the fact that Inspire Art dealt exclusively in the
Netherlands, the Chamber of Commerce applied to the Kantongerecht
te Amsterdam that it should be added to the registration that Inspire
Art  is  a  formally  foreign  company  resulting  in  the  application  of
stricter  provisions  regarding  disclosure,  accounting,  and  minimum
capital  requirements.  Inspire  Art  denied  that  its  registration  was
incomplete. In the following legal conflict, the Kantongerecht asked
the ECJ to decide if Articles 43 and 48 preclude the Netherlands from
attaching additional conditions to companies correctly formed under
the  law  of  another  Member  State  but  dealing  exclusively  in  the
Netherlands and, furthermore, if the WFBV contravenes Community
law (paragraph 39).
The  ECJ  decided  that  only  those  requirements  comply  with
Community law that correspond to the disclosure requirements set
out  in  the  11th Council  Directive  (89/666/EEC).  The  other
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requirements  going  beyond  Community  law  are  not  permissible,
respectively,  do  not  comply  with  the  freedom  of  establishment
(Schanze/Jüttner, 2003). In Inspire Art, the ECJ again stresses that
the fact alone that a company choses the least restrictive company
law “is not sufficient to prove the existence of abuse or fraudulent
conduct” (paragraph 139) which could justify national restrictions on
the  freedom  of  establishment  (Triebel/Hase,  2003).  Overall,  the
essence of the Inspire Art decision can be seen in that Member States
must recognise and respect companies formed in accordance with the
law of another Member State and that Member States are not allowed
to  impose  special  procedural  or  liability  provisions  on  foreign
companies (Bayer, 2003).
In sum, the ECJ has developed step by step a consistent case law
regarding companies' freedom of establishment. First, it decided on
the question as to limitations on the moving out of companies (Daily
Mail),  then,  on  the  issue  of  moving  in  (Centros)  and  on  the
recognition  of  companies'  legal  capacity  (Überseering).  Lately,  the
ECJ decided on the question as to additional  limitations to foreign
companies, incorporated correctly in another Member State but doing
business  solely  in  this  Member  State.  By  that  consistent
jurisprudence, the ECJ did not only begin to clarify the scope of the
freedom  of  establishment  but  also  provided  companies  with
predictability  of  law.  Thus,  taking  advantage  of  freedom  of
establishment might be considered as a real alternative with respect
to  the  legal  structure  of  companies  and  especially  board-level
representation arrangements.
What does this mean for board-level representation? According to the
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aforementioned ECJ rulings, companies can determine the applicable
company law by choosing the country of incorporation with respect to
its  specific  needs  and  wishes.  These  legal  provisions  do  not  only
concern  the  organisational  structure,  liability  or  minimum  capital
requirements  but  also  board-level  representation.  In  Europe,  the
intensity  of  board-level  representation  varies  from  no  compulsory
provisions  at  all  in  the  UK  to  equal  numbers  of  employees'
representatives and shareholders' representatives in the supervisory
board in Germany. It might be in the interest of the companies to
bypass  these  board-level  representation  (Heumann,  2003).
Consequently, those companies would incorporate rather in the UK
than in Germany or Austria.
Other European initiatives
In this context, two other European legislative initiatives should be
mentioned.  First  the  Council  Directive  on  the  common  system  of
taxation  applicabel  to  merger,  divisions,  transfers  of  assets  and
exchanges  of  shares  concerning  companies  of  different  Member
States (90/434/EEC), the so-called 14th company law directive. The
principle  aim  of  this  directive  is  to  eliminate  obstacles  to  cross-
boarder  activities,  in  particular  the  elimination  of  hidden reserves'
taxation, in order to provide European enterprises with the possibility
to  reorganise  their  activities  in  accordance  with  their  needs,
respectively, to adjust to the requirements of the Common Market
and,  consequently,  improve  their  competitive  position.  However,
some Member States, such as Germany, considered this directive as
another  possibility  for  companies  to  bypass  national  requirements
regarding worker participation. Thus, they insisted on a clause that
guaranteed retention of worker participation. In Article 11 paragraph
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1 lit b, Member States are empowered to refuse tax reliefs granted by
this  directive,  when  “  the  merger,  division,  transfer  of  assets  or
exchange of shares results in a company [..] no longer fulfilling the
necessary conditions for the representation of employees on company
organs according to arrangements which were in force prior to that
operation”.  As  a  result,  the  14th company  law  directives  was  not
considered anymore as threat for worker participation. Unfortunately,
it has not been transformed into national law by all Member States,
for instance Germany (Maul et al, 2003).
Finally,  the  proposal  for  a  directive  on  cross-border  mergers  of
companies with share capital (European Commission, 2003), the so-
called 10th company law directive,  is  presented.  Although the first
proposal was presented by the Commission in 1984, unfortunately,
this directive has not been enacted so far. One of the main reason for
that  is  the  issue  of  worker  involvement  (Mävers,  2002).  While
Member States in which worker involvement is highly regulated were
afraid  of  companies  bypassing  national  requirements  by  cross-
boarder mergers, Member States in which worker involvement does
not  play  any  role  feared  that  their  companies  could  be  forced  to
introduce some form of worker participation resulting in a deadlock.
When Member States agreed on the SE in December 2000, discussion
on  the  10th company  law  directive  revived  and  resulted  in  the
aforementioned proposal. 
The present proposal differs from the original proposal mainly in two
instances.  First,  the proposal  originally  covered  only  public  limited
companies.  Now it  covers all  joint-stock-companies,  i.e.  companies
that have legal personality and that possess separate assets which
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alone  serve  to  cover  its  debts  (Article  1).  In  its  explanatory
memorandum, the Commission states that it is provided mainly for
companies that are not interested in establishing a SE, “for the most
part  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises”  (SME)  (European
Commission,  2003:3).  Joint-stock-companies  concerned  must  be
incorporated under the law of a Member State and must have their
registered office within the EU. Additionally,  two of  the companies
concerned  are  governed  by  the  law  of  different  Member  States.
Generally speaking, when talking about cross-boarder mergers two
types are distinguished (Article 1). On the one hand, cross-boarder
merger means that one or more companies transfer their assets and
liabilities to another existing company. On the other hand, it means
that two or more companies transfer all their assets and liabilities to a
new company. Additionally, the proposal of the directive provides a
third possibility: a company transfers all its assets and liabilities to
the  company  holding  all  the  securities  or  shares  representing  its
capital. Regarding details on the course of the merger, the reader is
referred to Maul et al (2003). 
The  second  difference  to  the  original  proposal  is  seen  in  the
provisions  concerning  worker  participation,  meaning  board-level
representation. Actually,  three cases can be distinguished. Case 1:
The  companies  concerned  are  not  covered  by  board-level-
representation and the country where the merger has is registered
office does neither. Then nothing changes. The merger does not have
board-level representation. Case 2: The companies concerned are not
covered  by compulsory  board-level  representation or  one or  more
companies concerned are covered by board-level representation and
the country where the merger has its registered office does impose a
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certain  form  of  board-level  representation.  In  this  case,  worker
participation in the merger is ruled by the provisions of the member
state, where the merger has its registered office. This means, that if a
French SA acquires a German AG. They merge cross-boarders with
their  registered  office  in  France.  Thus,  worker  participation  is
governed  by  French  provisions.  Case  3:  One  or  more  companies
concerned are covered by board-level representation, but the country
where the merger has its registered office does not impose board-
level representation.  In this respect, the directive directly refers in
Article 14 to relevant articles of the SE/Re as well as the SE/Di. In
fact,  the  management  has  to  negotiate  with  employees'
representatives on the matter. If they come to an agreement, it is
applicable. If they cannot come to an agreement, the most intensive
form of worker participation in one of the companies concerned is
applicable. 
In  sum,  it  can  be  said  that  worker  participation  in  the  company
created  by  merger  depends  first  of  all  on  national  compulsory
provisions. Only in the case that one of the companies concerned is
already subject to compulsory or voluntary worker participation and
the domestic law does not provide any provisions regarding board-
level representation, then Article 14 applies resulting in negotiations
on worker participation closely related to those in a SE. 
Resume
In conclusion, it can be said that currently companies have numerous
choices regarding their legal structure. The variety is even so great
that it might be confusing for companies to find the appropriate legal
arrangement (Maul et al, 2003). Regarding the choices discussed in
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this paper, it appears that the SE satisfies the needs of large groups
probably best (Hommelhoff,  2001).  Large groups from outside the
EU/EEA will even have the possibility of structuring their European
business  in  a  uniform  manner  for  the  first  time.  The  other  two
alternatives,  freedom  of  establishment  and  the  proposal  of  the
merger-directive,  seems to  fit  best  the  needs  of  SMEs  (European
Commission, 2003) and might be of great interest for groups when
restructuring their European business (Maul et al, 2003).
The  danger  of  the  erosion  of  board-level  representation,  as
promulgated especially in countries that have high levels of board-
representation, appears as being averted for the moment at least as
far  as  the  SE  and  the  proposed  merger-directive  is  concerned.
Currently,  it  seems that  the  only  possibility  to  bypass  board-level
representation is provided by the freedom of establishment. However,
the question remains if, for example, German or Austrian companies,
which are  subject  to  compulsory  board-level  representation,  would
consider establishment of, for example, a joint-stock company under
British  or  Spanish  law  only  in  order  to  bypass  board-level
representation, which remains only one of several criteria, interalia
the  tax  burden  and  liability  or  disclosure  requirements,  that  is
relevant for the decision on the legal structure. 
Overall, one can look upon the mentioned initiatives favourably. Even
though pressures on the national corporate governance systems will
continue to increase, these initiatives must be advanced in order to
provide  European  enterprises  with  appropriate  legal  arrangements
and,  in  consequence,  increases  their  competitiveness.  Eventually,
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these  initiatives  might  contribute  to  a  further  convergence  of  the
corporate governance systems within the EU and might result in a
European system of corporate governance in the long-term.
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